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The trade-off between Usability and Security has been well researched with various models 
proposed on how best to improve Usability without jeopardizing Security and vice visa. Usable 
Security has become a key factor in Mobile Financial Services (MFS), the new frontier for mobile 
phones utilisation. However, have the compromises gone too far? The trustworthiness of MFS 
system has already slowed down new adoption and impacted ongoing security trust issues and 
user confidence in spite of potential MFS benefits for its users. To understand this growing lack of 
trust with MFS, we need to comprehend the nature of Usable Security in assuring the behaviours of 
MFS users and determine the right trade-off to improve trust whilst facilitating future uptake. We 
conducted an empirical survey of 698 user’s experience of MFS and here present our findings of 
this investigation for further synthesis towards proposing practical control elements to assure 
Usable Security in MFS.  
 Mobile Financial Services, Trust, Usability, Security, Usable Security, Cybersecurity 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial service is the new global frontier for 
mobile phones. Increasing numbers of customers 
now prefer banking through Mobile Financial 
Services (MFS); use of mobile phone as a means 
to conduct banking and other financial services 
(PwC, 2017). Moreover, the mobile platforms 
facilitate financial services to over 2 billion users, 
including a proportion of the world population that 
hitherto had no access to financial services (World 
Bank, 2018). The use of MFS as an alternative 
banking channel has also benefited regional 
banking by reducing the operational cost of online 
businesses (Sri and Gilang, 2015).  
Whether serving as alternative banking channel or 
as the only means to access financial services, a 
wide range of mobile enabled financial solutions 
needs to be developed to meet the unique needs of 
each customer group. However, the increasing lack 
of trust in MFS has been a major challenge for 
customer adoption (Gao and Waechter, 2015). A 
contributing aspect is the lack of trust for MFS 
where Usable Security by design has become an 
important but compromised and often perceived as 
a failing component when deploying mobile security 
(Faily and Lacob, 2017). The MFS problem of 
Usable Security is not totally surprising, given the 
wide range of stakeholders in the MFS ecosystem 
(Ambore et al, 2016) on one hand and the “rush to 
mobile” on the other hand, which makes mobile 
solution developers focus more on meeting delivery 
targets (Ponemon, 2015) to the detriment of a 
usable and secure MFS solutions that should also 
meet the assured privacy needs of the end- user. 
The current trade-off between Usability and 
Security has been studied in various contexts 
(Alshamsi, Williams and Andras, 2016). To 
understand the extent to why Usable Security is an 
essential component to the MFS domain, we need 
to comprehend its unique context and how to 
ensure the right balance between Usability and 
Security is deployed, specifically from the user’s 
perspective. 
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In recognition of Usable Security in mobile phone 
applications, Mobile Phone Operating System (OS) 
Original Software Developers (OSD) have 
published guidelines on Usability and Security at 
various levels (Ofcom, 2013). Though these 
guidelines are generally useful for users of Mobile 
OS and mobile application developers, many do 
not address the specific need of Usable Security for 
MFS. 
This research provides an understanding of the key 
elements and comprehends the essential 
assurance issues and risk mitigation that Usable 
Security is required to provide MFS in order to 
establish trust from its user communities. The 
motivation of this work is to provide a Cybersecurity 
Countermeasure Framework and establish the 
principles for Usable Security for the assured use 
of MFS and thereby, improve its global adoption by 
increasing, sceptical public. 
This paper highlights the results and understanding 
obtained from a survey of 698 users of MFS. It 
continues in Section 2 by reviewing related work. 
The methodology used for the research work is 
described in Section 3. Section 4 describes the 
results from this study. The paper concludes in 
Section 5 and also provides some direction for 
future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
The trade-off between Usability and Security has 
been a subject intense discussion, the question of 
how to ensure security without compromising 
security has been the goal of many research works. 
For instance, Braz et al, (2007) developed a model 
called “Security Usability Symmetry” (SUS) which 
provides guidelines that acknowledge usability 
constraints and their potential impact on security in 
addressing the trade-off between Usability and 
Security.  
In a paper advocating Security and Usability 
together during design to address any concerns 
with the trade-off between Usability and Security, 
Yee, (2004) opined that “conflicts between Security 
and Usability can often be avoided by taking a 
different approach to security in the design process 
and the design itself”. Similarly, an approach to 
predict trade-offs between Security and Usability 
for mobile application requirements engineering 
within the unique context of mobile computing, was 
proposed by Roh and Lee, (2017).  
Analysing Security and Usability scenarios, Wang 
et al, (2017) proposed recommendations on 
improving security without jeopardising usability. A 
tool approach for collaboration between security 
and usability engineering was proposed by Faily 
and Iacob, (2017).  
While all these papers focused on enhancing the 
optimal Usability Security trade-off, other works 
have a different approach to addressing the 
concern. For instance, Adams and Sasse, (1999), 
looked at the roles of the end-user and impact of 
wrong perceptions of user behaviour in designing a 
user-centred security mechanism. They argued that 
security mechanism and policies that do not 
consider users’ work practices might lead to 
developing security mechanism that would result in 
insecure user behaviours.  
The dimension of identifying internal and external 
threat elements that impact on Usability, Security or 
both was examined by Kainda et al, (2010). They 
proposed a model that would help in conducting 
Usability-Security analysis with the aim of 
identifying factors that affect Usable Security. While 
some of the factors identified by the model 
(effectiveness, efficiency etc) affect Usability alone, 
other factors (vigilance, motivation and social 
context, etc) impact on Security. Factors like 
memorability and knowledge affect both Usability 
and Security and as such are central to both.  
Though user-centred design helps in improving 
Usable Security, Cranor and Buchler (2014) 
opinioned that the balance between Usability and 
Security would be gained from understanding the 
user decision-making process. They believe it is 
imperative for solution designers to consider the 
decision-making process to assign to users when 
designing a system.  
In a study to identify Usability and Security issues 
in MFS with a bid to develop a solution to resolve 
them, Smith (2017) identified and presented criteria 
for Usable Security as identified by literature. While 
some were traditional criteria for Usability e.g.  
effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction etc, criteria 
like vigilance, trust, empowered user, feedback, 
awareness, motivation, context of use and user 
behaviour; were identified as factors that affect 
Usable Security.  
This examination of previous work carried out in 
Usable Security shows that various models have 
been proposed to address the Usability Security 
trade-off in the design and requirements gathering 
phase of solution development. The need to 
collectively address Usability and Security to 
improve this balance was also proposed. In order 
to ensure the designers’ intention meets the need 
of the end-user, it has been proposed that the 
“weak link” should be at the focus of designing a 
usable secure system. Furthermore, the 
examination revealed that in addition to traditional 
elements of Usability and Security, some elements 
exist that impact both Usability and Security.  
Though previous research has provided insights on 
how to ensure that the Usability and Security 
balance does not result in a zero-sum outcome, the 
nature of Usable Security in MFS and the elements 
that affect them has not been investigated. 
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Furthermore, users of MFS bear the brunt of design 
decisions that impact Usable Security, it is 
therefore imperative (to Operators), to understand 
user behaviour in the use of MFS which when 
considered could improve design decisions that 
would lead to usable secure MFS. 
This exploratory research orchestrates further 
understanding to identify observable and latent 
elements central to Usable Security in deployed 
MFS and how to improve trust in MFS based on 
information gathered from MFS users. The 
research also examines how user behaviour affects 
Usable Security of MFS. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In order to better understand the impact of balance 
between Usability and Security in the use of MFS, 
we conducted an end-user survey. The survey 
questionnaires were distributed via electronic and 
paper-based correspondence. The completed 
questionnaires were then analysed and presented. 
3.1 Survey Design 
The survey questionnaire was developed based on 
Usability, Security and Usable Security criteria 
derived from literature that highlighted elements of 
Usability, Security and Usable Security (Wich and 
Kramer, 2015; Coursaris and Kim, 2006; Nielsen, 
1995), Usability and Security related questionnaires 
from previous surveys (Mifsud, 2015; Lewis, 1995; 
Hoehle and Venkatesh, 2015), and critical 
examination of current threat landscape for MFS.  
The population size for the survey was 
approximately 31 million; which is the number of 
unique bank accounts in Nigeria, the country of 
study. A sample size with 95% confidence level 
and 5% error rate based on Cochran's formulas, 
created an ideal sample size to satisfy the 
confidence level and error margin comes to 385 
(Barlett, et al, 2001). A total of 698 responses were 
obtained at the close of the survey. 
The survey was distributed electronically via social 
media (Facebook and WhatsApp), emails and 
could be completed using a PC, tablet or mobile 
phone. Hardcopy of the survey was also deployed. 
The paper-based survey was piloted with 15 
participants focus group, while the online version 
was piloted with a second focus group of 7 
participants. The purpose of these pilots was to 
obtain feedback on the content, time demand for 
survey completion and to also test survey logic. 
Paper-based participants completed the survey in 
an average of 11 minutes while online participants 
completed the survey in an average of 9 minutes 
during the pilot phase.  
3.2 Survey Feedback 
The survey ran for 2 months. At the end of the 
survey period, 698 participants completed the 
questionnaire. 328 responses were obtained via 
electronic channels; while 370 paper-based 
surveys were completed and returned. In designing 
the online survey, a control was set to ensure only 
Mobile Financial Services users completed the 
survey. Rather than just exiting the survey, non-
users were directed to a short survey that 
examined their reasons for not using MFS and 
required changes that would make them use MFS. 
Moreover, the survey feedback had 29 non-MFS 
users in total from which these 2 questions were 
not analysed as part of the survey. Furthermore, 53 
of the paper-based responses had a large number 
of questions unanswered and were not considered 
for analysis. A total of 616 survey feedback 
responses were eventually analysed. 
The survey was analysed using the Bristol Online 
survey, SPSS statistical package and Microsoft 
Excel 2016. 
The first step in the survey was to cleanse the 
survey data. Although the deployed survey had 43 
questions, due to the presence of multiple choice 
options and the ‘others’ option in some questions, a 
total of 106 unique variables were generated. The 
clean-up focused on 8 questions that allowed 
participants select more than one option in a 
question. For instance, a participant might use both 
an Apple phone and a Samsung phone to access 
MFS. A participant could also use several MFS 
products etc. It was thus necessary to account for 
all the various combinations in the data. At the end 
of the exercise, 65 clean variables were obtained. 
The survey questionnaire was segmented into 8 
sections based on factors that affects both Usability 
and Security as summarised in (Smith, 2017) 
relationship between questions and ease of 
administration as follows: 
i. Participants’ details: 
This section had 5 questions that sought to 
understand age, income and educational level of 
participants along with employment status and type 
of employment. 
ii. Product Type and Means of Use: 
This section gathered information on phone type, 
MFS type and means of access to the MFS 
products. 
iii. Experience: 
This section had 5 questions that sought to obtain 
feedback from user experience based on use of 
MFS. It also sought to understand user perception on 
the complexity of MFS and its end-user security 
mechanism. 
iv. Awareness: 
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This section measures the awareness of privacy, 
products, roles and responsibilities of participants 
on the MFS they use.  
v. Maintenance: 
This section sought to understand user behaviour 
as regards basic application and phone 
housekeeping tasks and how it impacts on security 
and usability.  
vi. Usability: 
This section gauges user perception on various 
elements of usability of the MFS. 
vii. Security: 
This section sought to understand user perception 
on confidentiality, integrity and availability of MFS. 
viii. Social Context: 
The last section examines how social and 
environmental issues might impact on usable 
security. 
ix. Stand out Questions: 
Some standout questions not categorised in any of 
the previous sections were included in the survey. 
Questions were asked to gather information on 
participants whose MFS have been compromised 
in the past and their use behaviours. An ‘additional 
feedback’ section was included to capture any 
other thoughts.  
3.3 Survey Analysis 
With the survey data sets of 43,120 unique 
elements, it was imperative to approach the 
analysis of this survey in a way that would provide 
insight into the data, given the survey objectives 
which include: 
i. Understanding observable and latent elements 
central to Usable Security in the use of MFS; 
and 
ii. Impact of user behaviour on Usable Security 
A review of available survey tools was performed 
with a view to understand the most suitable 
resource to answer the questions of this 
exploratory survey. The following tools were 
identified and used to conduct analysis of the data. 
i. Descriptive Statistics. 
This tool provided basic descriptive statistics e.g. 
frequency of the collated data. It helped to 
summarize and provide descriptive information 
about the collated data. It provided occurrence 
rates for responses, mean, median mode etc. The 
analysis of the data collated from this survey 
benefitted from descriptive statistics tool 
(how2stats, 2011).  
ii. Correlation: Bivariate Analysis 
This analysis sought to understand the relationship 
between variables in the survey, describe the effect 
that 2 or more phenomena occur together and their 
linkages. Since this research seeks to understand 
relationships between variables it would benefit 
from correlation. A bivariate analysis provided 
insight into the relationship between user privacy 
perception and privacy awareness (how2stats, 
2011). 
iii. Principal Component analysis (PCA) 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is an 
exploratory multivariate analysis technique which 
seeks to describe the underlying structure in a data 
matrix (how2stats, 2011). PCA is a technique for 
investigating the interdependence within groups of 
variables. It is concerned with the relationships 
between observable variables and unobservable 
latent variables presumed to be generating the 
observations. In this research for instance, 
relationships between variables that would not 
have been apparent from the use of the tools 
previously discussed, were examined using PCA. 
PCA helped to expose latent variables not visible 
by using simple correlation techniques and cross 
tabulation. 
In order to gain insight into group or related 
questions, an analysis of question clusters using 
PCA was implemented. This helped to simplify and 
reduce the number of variables needed to be 
analysed without any negative impact on the final 
output. 
The results of the analysis are as described in the 
next section. 
4. SURVEY RESULTS 
4.1 User behaviour 
An average MFS user is young, middle income and 
educated. 72.3% of the respondents were between 
25-44 years, out of which 36.7% were between the 
ages of 35 to 44 years, while those between the 
ages of 25 to 34 years accounted for the 35.6%. 
Majority of MFS users (42.7%) have at least an 
undergraduate degree. This is understood given 
that the predominant MFS product used is Mobile 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.0: Age distribution of respondent 
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Banking, which presupposes respondents have 
bank accounts with some stream of income, but 
latch onto the use of MFS for convenience.  
Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD), 
a cellular network communications channel is one 
of the leading platforms for MFS. USSD channel 
(30.8%) is only second to Mobile Banking (65.4%) 
in channels for conducting MFS. Figure 1.0 shows 
the age distribution of respondents. 
MFS has three components; Mobile Money, which 
provides financial services to customers without 
access to banks, Mobile Banking; an alternative 
banking channel and Mobile Payment; using Mobile 
Money or Mobile Banking for payments. Adoption 
of Mobile Money amongst respondents was the 
lowest of all MFS products at 7.4%. However, 20% 
of the respondents (123) use Mobile Payment, 
Mobile Money and Mobile Banking products. 65% 
of the respondents have used MFS for 12 months 
and above. Only 13.3% of the respondents have 
used MFS for 6 months or less. Respondents 
overwhelmingly use Android and Windows to 
access MFS with only 14% using iOS-based 
phones to access the service.  
Mobile application download is the predominant 
way to setup MFS, with 71.3% of the respondents 
setting up MFS service on their devices by 
downloading from authorized application stores. A 
third party set up the service for 15.9% of the 
respondents while 4.1% of the respondents could 
not explain how the MFS they used was setup.  
PIN is a leading authentication mechanism for 
MFS. About 20% of the respondents use Multi 
Factor Authentication (MFA) to access the MFS 
they use. PIN with 71.6% is the most predominant 
authentication mechanism, though most times used 
in combination with token. 
Mobile Network Operator (MNO) data plan is the 
most preferred means of accessing MFS. 62.6% of 
the respondents use both Wi-Fi and MNO data plan 
to access MFS, but more often than not use MNO 
data. 
Convenience (29.7%), ease of use (30.3%) and 
availability of service (33.8%) are the leading 
influencers that made respondents choose to use 
MFS service. 
Complexity as against insufficient knowledge is the 
major cause of transaction errors in the use of 
MFS. 24.5% of the respondents often experience 
transaction errors when using MFS. 20.9% of the 
respondents often perform a single task several 
times due to the complexity of the MFS. 
Respondents generally disagree (81.1%) that 
insufficient knowledge on the use of MFS makes 
them to conduct a single task several times.  
Unstable internet service frustrates MFS users. 
65.2% of the respondents said poor or fluctuating 
internet service frustrates them the most when 
using MFS. Unsatisfactory level of support from 
operators (31.7%) and lack of transaction feedback 
(26.1%), are other major sources of frustration. 
63.4% of the respondents share the same phone 
they use for MFS with others. 29% of the 
respondents use the same PIN they use for 
authenticating their mobile phones to authenticate 
MFS transactions on their phone. 26.6% of the 
respondents write their authentication details 
somewhere on their phones to enable easy recall.  
MFS users claim not to like security controls that 
are complex. 78.8% of the respondents believe PIN 
authentication alone is sufficient to secure their 
MFS transactions. However, when asked if they 
would need an additional level of authentication 
(53.3%) answered in the affirmative. Most 
respondents (30.8%) cannot differentiate real 
Mobile applications from rouge ones. Most 
respondents have no knowledge of Cyber threats 
that can affect MFS users like Ransomware, 
smishing, and Mobile Malware.  Figure 2.0 shows a 
distribution of end-user understanding of rogue 
applications. 
However, respondents claim to have an average 
knowledge level on privacy. Most participants are 
ignorant of the connection between update of 
mobile phone Operating System (OS) and periodic 
update of MFS applications on the security of the 
system. 87.5% of the respondents do not agree 
that the security of MFS transactions depends on 
the update of their mobile phone OS. Furthermore, 
84.4% of the respondents indicated that the 
security of the MFS they use does not depend on 
how frequently the MFS application is updated.  
Respondent claim to prefer security to ease of use 
in MFS. Respondents preferred a secure 
transaction (66.6%) than an easy to use MFS 
system. Nevertheless, they would also prefer if the 
security control is easy to use. 
4.2 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Result 
To conduct the PCA, we first conducted a cluster 
analysis on a group of variables. Cluster analysis is 
 
Figure 2.0: User knowledge of Rogue applications 
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a multivariate method which aims to classify 
objects based on certain similarities into groups 
(Cornish 2007, Hair et al, 1998). 
In conducting the clustering analysis, variables that 
sought to analsye the same factors were placed in 
the same group. Each group was then jointly 
analysed in such a way as to reveal insights that 
might not be obvious in analysing single variables. 
For instance, analysing a single variable for effects 
of poor network on Usable Security provided some 
insight into the impact of network on usable 
security, analysing other environmental concerns 
together would provide deeper insight into the 
impact of environmental factors in general on 
usable security. 
6 clustered groups were classified as shown in in 
table 1.0 below. 
PCA results described in the rest of this section are 
based on cluster analysis of the groups in table 1.0. 
87.99% of the respondents believe the MFS 
system is complex. To obtain this feedback, 4 
questions were clustered and analysed together. 
These questions sought to understand task 
completion rate, error rates, number of tries before 
successful completion of a task and reasons for the 
multiple attempts. 10.7% however believe the 
system is easy to use; whereas 1.3% of the 
respondents were indifferent. Out of the 
respondents who say the MFS they use is complex 
to use, the largest group of participants who find 
the system complex to use are within the 35 to 44 
years age bracket. Those within the age range of 
18 to 24 years find it easy to use. However, 68.02% 
of the respondents are satisfied with the usability 
attributes of MFS. 53.73% of the respondents 
believe the security of the MFS they use is 
adequate. Table 2.0 shows the distribution of 
perception of complexity. Gaps between perception 
on understanding of privacy and demonstration of 
privacy in practice exist. While 78.9% of 
respondents claimed to have a basic to expert level 
knowledge on privacy, 79.71% of the respondents 
did not demonstrate understanding of privacy and 
its implication in the use of MFS products, based 
on use behaviour. For instance, respondents that 
claim an above average knowledge of privacy and 
its implication on the use of MFS still share their 
phones with friends and family. They use the same 
PIN for their phones and MFS, they also write 
authentication details for the MFS on their phones. 
Table 3.0 shows the distribution of privacy based 
on use behaviour. 
Though respondents cannot directly link the impact 
of updating their mobile OS, mobile applications or 
antivirus to the security of MFS, 82.63% of 
respondents update their phone operating system, 
Mobile applications and phone antivirus as at when 
due. 
60.2% of respondents believe environmental issues 
like weak internet network strength, incoming 
phone calls during transactions, environment of use 
and low battery life have an impact on security and 
usability of MFS. 20% of the respondents believe 
these factors do not impact on usability and trust 
while another 19.3% were indifferent. 
Majority of those with high degree of trust on MFS 
(61.9%) did not receive any training or sensitization 
before they commenced use of the system. 
Awareness and training might mean different 
things. It might also mean that training was not 
sufficient. 
 
 
Table 1.0: Description of grouped classification used for 
cluster analysis 
 
Sn Group Description Short Name 
1 Complexity of 
system 
Gauging user 
perception on 
complexity of MFS 
and its security 
mechanism 
Complexity 
2 Awareness of 
privacy 
Awareness of privacy 
in use behaviour of 
MFS. 
Privacy 
3 End-user 
patching 
User behaviour in 
maintaining updated 
OS, application and 
antivirus 
Patching 
4 Usability User perception on 
usability of MFS 
Usability 
5 Security User perception on 
security of MFS 
Security 
6 Environmental 
Impact 
Impact of 
environmental factors 
on usable security of 
MFS 
Env 
 
Table 2.0: Complexity 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid easy 66 10.7 10.7 
Neutral 8 1.3 12.0 
complex 542 88.0 100.0 
Total 616 100.0  
 
Table 3.0: Privacy 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid high privacy 125 20.3 20.3 
low privacy 491 79.7 100.0 
Total 616 100.0  
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 Table 4.0: Descriptive statistics of observable usable security factors 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N 
Complexity 31.67 6.622 616 
Privacy 6.75 2.586 616 
Patching 19.14 5.670 616 
Usability 8.60 2.461 616 
security 6.68 1.915 616 
Env 6.29 1.717 616 
 
 
Figure 3.0: Scatter Plot showing correlation between component 
4.3 Observable Variables 
This section shows the relationship between 
observable variables and unobservable latent 
variables generating the observations, based on 
PCA analysis. Table 4.0 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the observable factors. 
As shown in table 4.0, Complexity has a mean of 
31.67 and a variation of 6.622. Complexity also 
shows the highest deviation. Patching has the 
second highest mean and accounts for the second 
highest deviation. While user behaviour on Security 
and Env, show the least deviation.  
The PCA correlation matrix shows that all 6 
observable variables have a direct or inverse 
relationship. Table 5.0 shows the result of the PCA 
correlation matrix. 
Table 5.0 shows that Usability and Security have 
the highest positive correlation factor of 0.552,   
Complexity has a negative correlation with both 
Usability (-0.302) and Security (-0.302). This 
implies Complexity has an impact on both Usability 
and Security. The more complex the system is, the 
lower the Security and Usability of the system and 
vice versa. The coefficient of correlation of Privacy 
to Usability is 0.173, while that Privacy to Security 
is 0.165. This implies that participants’ level of 
privacy based on system use also has a positive 
correlation on both Usability and Security. The 
higher a participant’s level of privacy in using MFS, 
the higher the Usability and Security of the system.  
The coefficient of Privacy variable to Usability is 
0.249 while the coefficient of Patching variable to 
Security is 0.264. This shows that regular updates 
of phone OS, apps and antivirus correlate with 
higher level of Usability and Security.  
In summary, system complexity, privacy, frequency 
of updates, and level of trust are correlated with 
both Usability and Security. Correlation between 
components is further depicted by a scatter plot as 
shown in figure 3.0.  
4.4 Latent Variables 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy of 0.638 indicates proportion of variance 
in entire variables (Williams et al, 2010). Standard 
deviation measured the proportion of independent 
variables; in this case, KMO measures the variation 
of interdependence of all observable variables. The 
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  Table 5.0: PCA Correlation Matrix 
 
result from the KMO Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
shows that for the 616 respondents being 
analysed, 64% of them have certain commonality. 
However, about 36% variation exists amongst 
respondents. 38% have distant opinions.  
 
According to KMO results, the sampling adequacy 
had 36% variation, this implies only 64% of the 
variation has been explained. To optimize the 
model to account for 80% of the variables, 
correlations on latent components were examined. 
Table 6.0 shows KMO Bartlett’s test results. 
Further analysis shows that 4 latent variables 
cumulatively account for 82.751% variation. This 
implies that in addition to the 6 observable 
variables discussed earlier, some latent variables 
that impact Usable Security in the use of MFS 
exist. Table 7.0 shows the component matrix 
analysis of observable variables against latent 
variables (components). 
Component matrix analysis of the 6 observable 
variables (Complexity, Privacy, Patching, Usability, 
Security and Env) against the 4 latent variables 
revealed that there was a correlation between the 
first latent component and all 6 observable 
variables. The first component loads heavily on 
Usability and Security. It has a strong positive 
correlation coefficient of 0.8 on Usability and 0.76 
on Security. It has a negative correlation of -0.58 
on Patching and a low positive correlation on 
Complexity (0.31), Privacy (.049) and Env (0.37) 
respectively. 
The second latent component loads positively on 
Complexity (0.535) and Patching (0.735). However, 
it loads negatively (-0.606) on Privacy. The second 
component does not show correlation on Usability 
and Security and Env. 
The third component loads positively on Env (0.92) 
and has no correlation with the other 5 observable 
variables. 
The fourth component loads only on 2 observable 
variables; Privacy and Patching.  
As part of the PCA, a pattern matrix analysis and a 
structure matrix analysis were further conducted to 
gain more insight into the latent component, both 
matrixes revealed further correlation between the 
latent variables and the observable variables. The 
pattern matrix showed that Complexity has a 
bipolar loading while the second component loads 
heavily on Patching and a weak positive loading on 
Complexity. The third component loads heavily on 
Privacy and negatively on Complexity. 
5. DISCUSSIONS 
From the survey results, there was no evidence to 
show that age or income level has a direct effect on 
usable security; however, results obtained showed 
that younger people are more likely to forget their 
MFS login credential when compared to older 
people (60 years and above). This might not be 
unconnected with the fact that younger people 
might have the need to recall many login 
   Table 6.0: KMO Bartlett’s test 
 
Table7.0: Component Matrix 
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credentials which might affect memorability, while 
older people might have fewer applications to worry 
about. 
No significant difference was observed between 
participants who have been using MFS for over 12 
months and participants who have used the 
solution for a shorter period. 
Most users download applications they use from 
Mobile apps stores and majority of the users are 
unable to differentiate between real applications 
and rogue applications. Even though popular 
application stores like Apple store and Google Play 
store have controls, the possibility of jail-breaking 
or rooting exists. Users at times receive forwarded 
hyperlinks to sites where they can download certain 
applications from. While in terms of Usability this is 
preferable to downloading from the application 
stores, the risk of introducing mobile malware is 
further heightened. End-users should be educated 
on the need to download applications from only 
authorised sources to mitigate the risks of mobile 
malware attacks.  
 
Some respondents use multifactor authentication to 
access MFS, which is a good security control. 
However, the multiplicity of authentication 
credentials used by users for various phone 
applications makes majority of respondents save 
authentication information on the same phone they 
use and also share with family and friends, thereby 
introducing new security concerns. This behaviour 
seems to be predominant among the age range 25 
to 44 years, who incidentally have the highest 
population of MFS users based on this survey.  
 
MFS users prefer Security above Usability. 
Convenience and ease of use attract most users to 
MFS. Though users think MFS is complex to use, 
they prefer a secure MFS solution to one that is 
easy to use. However, they would also prefer if the 
security controls put in place to protect MFS are 
less complex. 
 
Environmental factors impact both the Usability and 
Security of MFS services. Users believe poor 
network, low battery, incoming calls to their phones 
while conducting MFS transactions affect Usability 
and Security of the system. 
 
Though most users of MFS are ignorant of the links 
between regular updates of Mobile phone O/S, 
applications and phone antivirus to Security and 
Usability of the system, they tend to update as 
soon as new updates are available.  
 
Knowledge of privacy does not translate to 
behaviours that exhibit understanding of the 
implications of privacy. Users generally have an 
understanding of privacy, but this does not reflect in 
behaviours of the use of MFS.  
 
There was no correlation between training and 
secure use of MFS. Most users that exhibit high 
level of trust in the existing MFS system did not 
receive any form of training on MFS before or after 
they commenced use of the system.  
 
Users that exhibit high level of trust on the system 
possess the following characteristics based on 
survey analysis: 
 
 They believe the transaction limits set on 
MFS is sufficient; 
 They believe their MFS transactions are 
protected from unauthorised disclosure 
irrespective of their past experience; 
 They believe their MFS transactions are 
accurate and consistent through-out its life-
cycle; and 
 They are satisfied with the reliability of the 
MFS system. 
 
There is a high degree of correlation between 
Usability and Security in the use of the MFS. 
Usability attributes like effectiveness, efficiency and 
learnability affect Security attributes like 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of MFS 
system. 
The PCA analysis shows that complexity of system, 
and awareness of privacy, Usability and Security 
are observable variables that affect Usable 
Security. While end-user exhibit good patching 
behaviour, they cannot relate the need to regularly 
update their mobile phones to its effect on security. 
The PCA further reveals that in addition to 
observable variables that affect Usable Security, 
some indirect factors exist in MFS user behaviour 
that affect Usable Security. One of these 
components has a positive correlation with 
Usability and Security while others have positive or 
inverse correlation to some observable variables. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
While previous studies have focused on 
understanding Usable Security trade-off from 
design perspective, this research examined the 
trade-off by analysing MFS user behaviours. The 
study revealed that users are capable of inherently 
exhibiting good security behaviours. For instance, 
users regularly update mobile phone OS, mobile 
applications and phone antivirus even when they 
do not understand the relationship between regular 
systems update to system security. Also, most 
users did not receive any training on how to use 
MFS or its security controls but figured out a safe 
way to use the system, even when it seemed 
complex. 
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MFS users prefer Security above Usability. Though 
users prefer less complex security controls, they 
would forego Usability for Security in the use of 
MFS, as a security failure would likely lead to 
financial loss. 
Usable Security of MFS impacts user behaviours 
and causes users to act in less secure ways. For 
instance, users store MFS login credentials on their 
phones and also share the same phones with 
family and friends. User awareness can be used to 
address this risk; however, the research has shown 
that user awareness does not always translate to 
good user security behaviour. This might be due to 
the usability of the awareness material or the gap 
between learning and awareness in practice. 
Furthermore, the study has shown through the 
behaviours of users of MFS that complexity of the 
MFS system, awareness of privacy by users, 
usability, security and environmental factors are 
central to Usable Security in the use of MFS.  The 
study also revealed that latent variables that impact 
Usable Security in the use behaviour of MFS exist. 
While Usability and Security trade-off is an 
important consideration during design and it is 
generally accepted that a right balance between 
Usability and Security would encourage good user 
behaviours, this study has shown that users of 
MFS will trade Usability for Security, even though 
they would prefer less complex security 
mechanism. The study has also revealed that users 
are inherently capable of good security behaviours 
even when the security mechanism seems a bit 
complex. 
Ensuring an optimal balance between Usability and 
Security might not be sufficient to address the trust 
gap in the use of MFS. To address the gap, user 
perception on the complexity of MFS and its 
security mechanism should be considered. Also, 
user awareness on privacy in the use of MFS, and 
the impact of environmental factors like internet 
network connectivity strength should also be 
considered. In addition to the aforementioned 
factors, latent elements in the use of MFS exist that 
have impact on the right balance between Usability 
and Security. Putting the same emphasis on these 
factors as currently done in ensuring an optimal 
balance between Usability and Security can lead to 
a cost-effective usable secured MFS. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
This study focused on understanding the impact of 
user behaviour on Usable Security and 
trustworthiness in the use of MFS. There is a need 
for a formal framework that will seek to address the 
identified factors that impact Usability and Security 
and consequently trust in the use of MFS. Future 
studies will seek to explore how to develop this 
framework. 
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